














(~ ~ ( i ~ No. 9555 ~ J ~ .~ `1 J
THE PARTNERED CORE OF AN ECONOMY
By Frank H. Page, Jr.









ISSN 0924-7815Tlle Partnered Core of an Ecoiloiny~`
F~ank H. Page, Jr.
Department of Finance, Economics, and Legal Studies,
Myrna Holtz Wooders,
Department of Economics,
First version: June 1994,
Current version: May 1995
Abstract
An allocation is in the partnered core if it admits no asymmetric dependen-
cies between players and groups of players. The partnered core of a game was
introduced in R.eny, Winter and Wooders (1993) andReny and Wooders (1993).
In this paper, in the context of a model with arbítrary consumption sets, we
introduce the partnered core of an economy and establish that no unbounded
arbitrage - a condition limiting gains from trade within groups and diversity
ofpreferences - is sufficient for the nonemptiness of the partnered core. Under
a condition of "extreme desirability" (including strict conve,xity as a special
case), no unbounded arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for nonemptiness of
the partnered oore. We also establish that with strict conve~city of preferences,
the Bennett and Zame (1988) result that a competitive payoff is partnered ex-
tends to situations with arbitrary consumption sets. ~ïom Werner (1987) and
the above results it follows that with strict convexity, no unbounded arbitrage
is necessary and sufficient for existence of a partnered competitive equílibrium
and nonemptiness of the partnered core.
'Thir. la~pcr in a revi~nl vcn:p~u uf AnU~auuu~ lR~ivcrsity, Ikluvtment of Gcunumics and Ernnomic
llistory W.P. 279.94. Although it is based on results in an enrlier versiun of that paper, this version
subsumes Page and Wooders (1993). The authors are grateful to Erik Balder and Elaine Bennett
fot óelpful comments and to the University of Tilburg for hospitslity and suplwrt during part of
the period in which this paper was written. Wooders also gratefully acknowledges the aupport of
the S.S.H.R.C. and the hoepitality and support of the Autónoma University and the University of
Alabama.
181 Introduction
A natural property of a distribution rule for an economy is that it has the ability to
prevent "asymmetric dependenciea". For example, if one player needs to trade with
another player to realize his core payoff but the other player dces not need to trade
with the first, then there is an asymmetric dependency. An allocation which does not
exhibit asymmetric dependencies ie cnlled a parlnerrdallocalion.
An allocation is in the partnered core if it is in the core and if, additionally,
there are no asymmetric dependencies between any pair of players. The partnered
core of a game with side paymenta was introduced in Reny, Winter and Wooders
(1993) and the partnered core of a game without side paymenta was introduced in
Reny and Wooders (1993). In this paper we introduce the partnered core of an econ-
omy with arbitrary consumption sets and show that the Page-Werner condition of
no unbounded arbitrage~ is sufl'icient for the existence of at least one partnered core
allocation. No unbounded arbitrage ia the condition that no group of agenta can
engage in unbounded, utility nondecreasing and rational trades. For "atrictly rec-
oncilable economiea," including those with etrictly convex preferences, we show that
no unbounded arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for nonemptiness of the partnered
core of the economy. Since the partnered core can significantly refine the core, our
resulta are stronger than analogous resulta for the core in Page and Wooders (1993).
The competitive payoff is not necessarily in the partnered core. This is a aignif-
icant wealmesa of the concept. If a group of players is dependent on another group
of players at the competitive prices, it is reasonable to suppose that the group in
the stronger position, instead of taking prices as given, will attempt to gain a more
favorable outcame for its members. Bennett and Zame (1988, Theorem 3), however,
demonstrate the important result that with strict concavity of preferences, the com-
petitive outcome has the partnership property. We demonstrate that their result
extenda to economies with arbitrary consumption sets and possibly nonmonotonici-
ties.
~Page (1984,1987) and Werner (1987).
1CThe model used in this paper is sufficiently similar to that of Werner (1987) so
that we can appeal to his proof for existence of an equilibrium. Also, we can readily
ptovide a sharpening of Werner's reault that no unbounded arbitrage is necessary
for existence of competitive equilibrium. Thus, for the model treated in this paper
no unbounded arbitrage is both necessary and sufficient for nonemptiness of the
partnered core and existence of equilibrium. From our results on the partnership
property of the competitive equilibrium it follows thnt, with a strengthening of our
condition of "extreme desirability" to strict convexity of preferences, no unbounded
arbitrage is necessary and s~ifficient for both the existence of a partnered competitive
equilibrium and nonemptiness of the partnered core.
Further motivation for the partnered core is provided by Reny and Wooders
(19956) who use the concept of partnership to provide an explanation of the division
of organizations into not-necessarily-self-sufficient states, as in a"commonwealth."
For additional motivation of pni~tnership, examples, and discussion of the literature
we refer the reader to the literature referenced in the current paper.
Before proceeding, we briefly place our work in the context of the literature. Nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for nonemptiness of the core of a game appear in Bon-
dareva (1962), Shapley (1967), Kaneko and Wooders (1982), Keiding and Thorlund-
Peterson (1987), Keiding (1993), Page and Wooders (1993,1994) and Chichilnisky
(1994).2 As has been established in the literature, conditions limiting arbitrage op-
portunities have an intimate connection with the competitive equilibrium. Both nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium appear in Green (1973),
Hart (1974), Grandmont (1982), Page (1982), Hammond (1983), Werner (1987), Page
and S~hlesinger (1993), Chichilnisky (1995), and Page and Wooders (1993,1994). A
detailed discussion of arbitrage in these papers and the relationship of the conditions
limiting arbitrages nppears in Page and Wooders (1994).
~Chichilnisky bns referenced mrlier Columbiaand Stanford University Discussion papers treating
the core nud arbitrnge, but wc have been unable to locate the papers in the referenced sources and
also unnble to obtain oopies.
22 An Economy with Arbitrary Consumptions Sets
and Nonmonotonicities
Let (X;,w;,u;(-))j-1 denote an exchnnge economy. Each agent j has a consumplion
sel X; C ~2~ and an erulovnnertl w; E X;. The j~s agent's preferences over X; are
epecified via a ulilily function u;(-) : X; ~~2.~
The set of individually mtional allocations is given by
A- {(xl,...,x") E X, X... X X" :
~~~ x; - ~~-~ w; and ui(xi) 1 ui(~i) for all j}.
The corresponding set of utility possióilálies is given by
U(A) -{(u~,...,u") E ~i" : for some (x~,...,x") E A, u; - u; (x) for all j}.
Given any individually rational allocation x-(x~,...,x") E A, let pr;(x) - x;.
For each x E X; the j`" agent's preJerred set is given by
Pi(xi) :- {i E X; : ui(~) ~ ui(xi)}.
The following assumptions on the economy (X;,w;,u;(-))~-~ will be maintained.4
(A-1)(a) For each j- 1,...,n, X; is closed and convex and c.i; E intX; where "int"
denotes `Snterior".
(A-1)(b) For each j - 1,...,n, u;(.) is continuous and concave with P;(x;) ~~6 for
all x; E pr;(A).
Thus, preferences are continuous, concave, and non-satiated at individually rational
nllocations.5
gWe use utility representations of preferencrs for ease of discussion. The results of this paper,
however, also hold for ordinal prc(erences where only quasi-concavity is required, as in Page and
Wooclcrs (1rJ93).
~Our nssumptious are chosen fur brevity and clarity; in other research we rclax several of the
asaumptions of this paper.
6TLis asswnptioa dues not imply local nonsatiation. Since arhitrage is a gblml rather than local
concept, auch satiation is not relevant.
3Given prices p E 32~, the cost of a consumption vector x -(x~,...,xL) E X~ is
(x,p) -~~~ xi. pi. The óudgel set for the jth agent is given by B(p,w~) -{x E X~ :
(p,x) G(p,w~)}. Without loss of generality we can assume that commodity prices
are contained in the unit ball C3 :- {p E~2L : IIPII C 1}.
An equilibrium for the economy (X„w„u~(.))~-~ is an (n f 1)-tuple of vectors
(i1i...,x,,,P) auch that
(i) (il, ..., x„) E A(the allocation is feasible);
(ii) p E B`{0} (prices are in the unit ball and not all pricea are zero);
(iii) and for each j,
(a) (-p,x~) - (p,w~) (budget constrainta are satis6ed) and
(b) P~(x~) fl B(p,w~) - Q) (there are no affordable preferred net trades).
2.1 Unbounded arbitrage
Given a subset S C ~tL, we say that y E Jt~ ia a direction of recession jor S if
x f ay E S for all a~ 0 and x E S. We shall denote by R(S) the set of all
recession directiona of S. If S is a closed convex set, then R(S) is a closed convex
cone containing the origin (Rockafellar (1970), Section 8). Thus, the tecession cone




u~(x -~ ~y) is nondecreasing in a for ~ 1 0}
and let
Z~(x) -{y E R(X~) : u~(x ~ ay) is increasing in ~ for ~ 1 0}.
For each j, CP~ is the set of net trades that are feasible and utility nondecreasing on
any scale starting at some consumption vector x E X~ whíle Z~(x) is the set of net
trades that are feasible and utility iiactr.asi~tg on any scale starting at a particular
consumption vector x E X~. For each agent j, CP~ is a closed convex cone containing
4the origin. We shall refer to CP~ as the j~ agenl's arbitrnge cone. As indicated by
the notation, the set of utility-increasing arbitrages Z~(x) depends on x but arbitrage
cones are independent of x.s
2.1.1 Reconcilable and strictly reconcilable economies
We will sometimes assume extreme desimbilily, that is,
(A-2) CP~`{0} - Z~(x) for all x in X~.
If an agent's utility function is atrictly concave,then(A-2) holds automatically.
An economy satisfying (A-1) ia said to be reconcilable - the diverse wanta of agents
can be reconciled by a price system. An economy satisfying (A-1) and (A-2) ia
said to be strictly reconcilaóle.
2.2 No unbounded arbitrage
As discussed by Page (1987,1989), in an exchange economy with heterogenous agenta
and poesibly unbounded consumption seta, unbounded arbitrages arise due to differ-
encea in agents' preferences. To ensure the boundednesa of the set of utility nonde-
creasing arbitrages, we utilize the Page-Werner condition of no unbounded arbitrage
(see Page (1984,1987) and Werner (1985,1987)). No unbounded arbitrage is a sim-
ilarity assumption on preferences, eliminating the possibility that any one trader
can find a mutually compatible trading partner (or group of trading partners) with
whom to engage in unbounded and possibility utility increasing trades. An economy
(X„w„u~(-))J-~ satisfies rw urabourtided arbitrnge if :
whenever ~~-~ y~ - 0 and y~ E CP~ for all agents j (1)
it holds that y~ - 0 for all agents j.
It is important to note thnt no imbounded arbitrage does not imply an absence of
bounded arbitrages for individual agents. (See Page (1989) and Page and Schlesinger
eIn contrast, with only the requirement o( quasi-concavity as in Page and Wooders (1993) rather
than concavity as in this paper, arbitrage cones may well depend on z.
5(1993) for further discussion of the distinction between bounded and unbounded
arbitrage.)
No unbounded arbitrage is equivalent to the condition that agents' recession cones
are striclly on one eide of a hyperplane through the origin. The following character-
ization is an immediate consequence of the classical Dubovitski-Milyutin Theorem.~
(See Page (1987) or Page and Woodera (1994).)
Proposition 1. (Charncterizalion ojno unóounded arbitmge.f Let (X„~„u~(-))~~
be a reconcilable economy. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) No unbounded arbitrage (1) holds.
(b) There exists a nonzero vector of prices p E B such that for any agent j and any
vector of net trades y E CP~ it holds that (p, y) ~ 0.
Thus, no unbounded arbitrage is equivalent to the condition that there exists a vector
of prices at which no individual has an opportunity for unbounded arbitrage.
With the Dubovitski-Milyutin Theorem in hand, we can now note that (b) is
a special case of the condition introduced in Page (1984) for a general equilibrium
model with price dependent preferences. Werner (1987) also usea (b). Page (1987),
again for a model with price-dependent preferences, asaumes (a). Page and Wooders
(1993) prove the equivalence of (a) and (b) from the Hahn-Banach Theorem.
The intimate connection between no unbounded arbitrage and competitive equi-
librium is summarized via the following result due to Werner (1987).s
Theorem. In a strictly reconcilable economy, no unbourtided arbilrage is necessary
7We are grnteful to Erik Balder for bringing the Dulwvitski-Milyutin Thcorem to our attention.
eln a general equilibrium model Werner shows that condition (b) in ProNosition 1 is suff'icient
for the existence of equilibrium snd notes that ifindifference curves contain no half-lines then (b) is
also nea,~xary for existence. In nn ns~;et market mudel with no redundant assets nnd sufficiently risk
averse agents, Page (1~J82) estaUlishes that (b) is necessary and sufRcient for existence ofequilibrium.
ULhcr authors, iu luvticulnr, llart (1974), Hammond (1983), and Chichilnisky (1995) obtain related
resiilts; LLese are reviewed in detail and related to the Dubovitski-Milyutin Theorem in Page aod
Wouders (1~J4).
6and su~icient for existence oj equiliórium. Let (Xi,~i,ui('))~-1 be a strictly recon-
cilable economy. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) (Xi,wi,ui('))~-~ has an equilibrium.
(b) There exiata a nonzero vector of prices p E S such that for any agent j and any
nonzero vector of net tradea y E CPi it holds that (p, y) 1 0.
The proof that (b) implies (a) can be found in Werner (1987). To see that (a)
impliea (b) let (il, ..., x,,,p) be an equilibrium for the economy and suppose that
condition (b) ie not satisfied. Then for some agent, say j, there is a nonzero vector
of net trades yi contained in CPi such that ~p,yi) G 0. Since the economy is etrictly
reconcilable, ui(~i -{-~yi) is increasing in a. Thus, for any a 1 O,xi f ayi E Pi(xi) fl
B(~i,~), contradicting the fact that (~~,...,x,,,p) is an equilibrium.9
3 The Partnered Core of an Economy
3.1 Partnered collections of players
Let N- {1,...,n} be a fmite set of players and let P be a collection of subaets of
N. Fo; each i in N let P; -{S E P: i E S}. The collection P has the partnership
property (fot N) if for each i in N the set P; is nonempty and for each pair of players
i and j in N the following requirement is satisfied:
ifP;CPithenPiCP;;
i.e. if all the cualitions in P that contain player i aLso contain player j then all the
coalitions that contain j aLso contain i. Two players i and j are pnrtners (or i is
partnemd wilh j) if P; - Pi. The interpretation of a partnered collection of sets
will be thnt there are no asymmetric dependencies. If i"needs" j, that is, if j is in
all the sets in the collection containing player i, then j needs i in the same sense.
oThis is actually a strengthening of Werner (1987) since Werner assumes that there are no half-
lines in indiFTerence surfar.eB; extreme desirability is a weaker condition.
7Note that the set of partners of an agent could be just the agent himself, or it could
be as large as the total agent set. The concept of partnership is further diacussed
in Bennett and Zame (1988), Reny, Winter, and Woodets (1993), and Reny and
Wooders (1993,1995b) and in papera referenced therein.
3.2 The game induced by an economy
For any coalition S C N, the set of S- allocations is given by
A(S) - {(xj)jES' ~jESxj - ~jE341j and
for each j E S, xj E Xj and uj(xj) 1 u~(~j)}.
Corresponding to the set of S-allocations is a set of util4ly possibitilies given by
U(A(S)) -{(uj)jEy : for some (xj)jES in A(S) it holds that uj - uj(xj) for each j E S}.
Now for each coalition of agenta S C N define
V(S) -{(u~,...,u„) : there exists (u'j)jES E U(A(S))
such that uj C u~ for all j E S}.
The pair (N,V) ia the game induced 6y the economy (Xj,wj,uj(.))~-~. The core of
the game (N,V) is defined as
C(N,V) -{u E V(N) : there dcea notexist a coalition S C N and
a u' E V(S) such that u~ ~ uj for all j E S}.
3.3 The partnered core
Let u E J2" be sttch thnt S(u) :- {S C N: u E V(S)} ~ 0. A utility vector u E 3i` is
parlnened if the collection of coalitiona S(u) is partnered. Let P(N,V) - {u E ~in :
S(u) ~ g and S(u) is partnered}. The partnemd core of a game (N,V), denoted by
C'(N,V), is given by
C'(N,V) - P(N,V) nC(N,V).
In interpretation, a payoff u E Ji" is in the partnered core of the game if it is in the
core and if there are no asymmetric dependencies. If some pair of players i and j,
8i is in all the coalitions in which j can tealize his core utility u~ then j is in all the
coalitiona in which i can realize his core utility u;. For games without eide paymenta,
the partnered core may constitute a"small" subset of the core - a single point, for
example, in a continuum. (See Example 1 in Reny and Wooders (1993)).
Let (X~,~„u~(.))~-~ be an economy. An allocation (xl,...,x„) E A is in the
partnemd cone ojthe economy if the utility vector (u~(xl),...,u„(x„)) E C'(N,V).
I.et
C~((Xi~ ~i, ui('))~-i)
denote the partnered core of the economy.
Theorem 1. No unbounded arbilmge is su,~cient for nonempliness oJ lhe partnered
core. Let (X„w„u~(.))~-~ be a reconcilable economy. If no unbounded arbitrage
holds, then there exists an allocation x' -(x~,...,x;,) E A in the partnered core
of the economy and u' :- (ul(x~),...,u„(x;,)) is in the partnered core of the game
induced by the economy.
To show non-emptiness of the core in Page and Wooders (1993) we were able
to appeal to the Debreu-Scarf (1967) result that an equilibrium is in the core. The
competitive equilibrium is not, in general, partnered. Thus, ottt proof of Theorem 1
appeals to the Reny and Wooders (1993) result that a balanced game has a nonempty
partnered core.~o All proofs are contained in Section 5.
Theorem 2. In a strictly reconcilable economy, no unóouruled arbitrage is necessary
and su,~icienl Jor nonemptiness oJ lhe parlnered core. Let (Xi,w„u~(.))~-t be a
strictly reconcilable economy. Then the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) The partnered core of the economy, C'((X„r.i„u~(-))~-~)), is nonempty.
(b) The partnered core of the game induced by the economy, C'(N, V), is nonempty.
~oSince the partnered core is a relatively new concept, the mathematical tools that would appear
to be required ta oUtain a clirect proof of our result have not yet bceu established. Fltrther research
aitnal in this d'vr,~tkm is in prugrca~; see I1eny and Wuodcrs (1995s) and Kannai and Wooders
(1995).
9(c) The economy satisfies no unbounded arbitrage (1).
The next result implies that Theorem 3 of Bennett and Zame (1988) holda in
an exchange economy with arbitrary closed, convex consumption sets and nonmono-
tonicities. Note, however, that we cannot use Theorem 3 to prove Theorem 1 since
Theorem 3 requires strict concavity (or strict quasi-concavity). Let (x~,...,x,,,p) be
an equilibrium for the economy (Xi,wi,ui(-))~-~. We say that (~~,...,x,,,p) is a part-
nemd competitive equilzb~sum if
(a) (x~,...,x,,,P) is an equilibrium and
(b) S(x~,...,i„) :- {S C N : ~iESxi - ~ieswi}is partnered.
Theorem 3. Thepartnership property ojthe competitive equilibrium. Let (Xi,~i,ui(~))~-1 be
a reconcilable economy auch that, for each agent j, ui(.) is strictly concave. If
(~~,...,á,,,p) is an equilibrium for the economy (Xi,wi,ui(.))~-~ then (~~,...,á,,,p) is
a partnered competitive equilibrium.
The following Corollary is an immediate consequence of the fact that strict con-
vexity of preferences implies extreme desirability, the proof of sufficiency of Werner
(1987), and Theorem 3.
Corollary. Nece.ssary arul su~cient condilions jor existertce oJ n partnered compet-
itive equitibriu~n and ~xonempti~aess oj lJie partnered core. Let (X„wi,ui(.))~-i be a
reconcilable economy such that, for each agent j, ui(-) is strictly concave. Then the
following statementa are equivalent:
(a) The partnered core of the economy, C'((X~,wi,ui(.))~-~)), is nonempty.
(b) The partnered core of the game induced by the economy, C'(N, V), is nonempty.
(c) The economy satisfies no unbounded arbitrage (1).
(d) The economy has a partnered competitive equilibrium.
10The reader may note that in all casea considered that the partnered core of the
game and the partnered core of the economy are related in the same way as in
economiea without short sales; there is a(possibly) many to one mapping from the
partnered core of the economy onto the partnered core of the game. Thia ia a reault
of the particular assumptiona on our model. In a further paper we show that without
theae assumptions, thie relationship between the core of the economy and the core of
the game, appropriately defined, may be broken.
4 Arbitrage and Boundedness
Our next results provide the building blocks for the proofs of our main Theorems.tt
To state these results, we require the notion of a bounded economy. Given a posi-
tive integer k, a k-bounded economy is denoted by (Xk„w„u~(.))~-t where Xk~ :-
Bk(w~) fl X~ and where Bk(~~) is the closed ball of radius k centered at the agent's
endowment w~.
The set of iradividually rationa! S-allocatiorts jor the k-bounded economy is
given by Ak(S) - {(xi)iES : ~~-~xi - ~~-~~~ and for each j E S, x~ E Xki
and u~(x~) 1 u~(~~)}. The corresponding aet of utility possibilities is given by
U(Ak(S)) -{(u~)~Ey : for some (x~)~ES in Ak(S), u~ - u~(x~) for each j E S}.
Theorem 4. No unbounded arbitmge is necessary and su,~cient jor compaclness
ojthe set ojindividually mliorta! allocations. Let (X„w„u~(.))~-~ be a reconcilable
economy. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) (X~,w~,u~(.))~-~ satisfies no unbounded arbitrage.
~~R.eBUlts in the literature on existence of eyuilibrium in economies with uubounded short sales
typically proceed by showing some sort of boundedness - sce the discussion in Page (1992). ESccept
[or Page and Wooders (1993), our boundedness results do not appear in the prior literature. ln
particular, they do not appear in Chicl~ilnisky (1994,1995) since she uses a diRerent economic model,
requiring a condition on norms of gradients to utility functàns. Moreover, she uses a different
condition limiting arbitrages.
11(b) There exists an integer k such that for any coalition S C N, A(S) - Ak(S) for
allk~k.
The following Corollary is an immediate consequence of the Theorem. It is im-
portant to note that the corollary does not claim that compactness of the utility
possibility set implies no unbounded arbitrage. Even if the utility possibility set is
compact, there may exist trivisl arbitrages - those that are not utility increasing
-and no unbounded arbitrage may be violated. The assumption that the economy is
strictly reconcilable rulea out trivial arbitragea.
Corollary. Compactness oj the utility possibility set: Let (X„m„u~(-))~-~ be a
reconcilable economy satisfying no unbounded arbitrage. Then for any coalition S C
N the set of utility possibilities U(A(S)) is compact.
Theorem 5. In a strictly reconcilable economy no unbounded arbitrage is necessary
and sujj`'icient jor compactness ojthe sets ojuliiilypossibilities. Let (X„w„ u~(.))~-I be
a etrictly reconcilable economy. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) (X~,w„u~(.))~-1 satisfies no unbounded arbitrage.
(b) There exists an integer k such that for any coalition S, U(A(S)) - U(Ak(S)) for
allklk.
It follows directly from the Corollary that if the economy is reconcilable, then no
unbounded arbitrage impliea that for any coalition S C N, V(S)f1~2N is compact.~~ It
follows directly from Theorem 5 that in a strictly reconcilable economy, no unbounded
arbitrage and compactness of V(S) fl ~i~ for every coalition S are equivalent.
~~For the game induced by the economy to satisfy the mnditáns of Scarf's (1967) Theorem, this
compactness is necesuvy. In preliminary versions of Pnge and Wooders (1993), the well-deónedness
of the induced game was used to show that no unbounded arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for
nonemptiness of the core.
125 Proofs
We first prove Theorem 4. Before proving the Theorem, we require three Lemmas.
Lemma 1. (Theorem 8.2, Roclcafellar ( 1970)). Let S be a closed convex set. The
following statementa are equivalent:
(a) y E R(S).
(b) y ie a cluster point of some sequence {~~x„}„ C S where {x„} C S and {~„} is
a sequence of positive real numbers converging to zero.
Lemma 2. Let (Xi,~i,ui(-))~-~ be a reconcilable economy. The following state-
ments are true for all j - 1, ..., n and x E X~.
(a) R(Pi(x)) - R(clPi(x))-
(b) R({x' E Xi : ui(x') ~ ui(x)}) - CPi .
(c) TZ(Pi(x)) - CPi .
Proof. (a) is an immediate consequence of Corollary 8.3.1 in Rockafellar (1970) and
(b) is an immediate consequence of Theorem 8.7 in Roclcafellar. To prove (c), fust
note that R(Pi(x)) C R({x' E Xi : ui(x') ~ ui(x)}). Let y E R({x' E Xi : ui(x') ~
ui(x)}). By (b) and the definition of CPi, ui(x f.1y) is nondecreasing in ~~ 0 for any
x E Xi. Suppose now that y~ R(Pi(x)). Then for some x' E Pi(x) and .~' sufficiently
large, ui(x' f Xy) C ui(x). But since ui(x') ~ ui(x), this contradicts the fact that
ui(x' ~~'y) is nondecreasing in ~ 1 0. ~
The following Lemma can be proven using elementary facts concerning sequences.
Lemma 3: Let {xA}k - {(x~,...,xn)}k C A be a sequence of individually ra-
tional allocations such that ~~-, Ilx;II -~ oo as k~ oo. Then for any cluster
point (y~,...,y„) of the sequence {akxk}k where ~k -(~J-1Ilxill~ ~it holds that
~;-i yi - 0 and ~~-i ~~yi~~ - 1.
Proof of Theorem 4: The proof that (b) implies (a) is obvious. To see that (a)
implies (b), it suffices to show that (a) implies that for some integer k, U(A) -
13U(Ak) for all k~ k. To see that this implication holds, consider the following. Let
{i't}k -{(i~,...,i~)}kC A be a sequence of individually rational allocations such
that for each k, (x~,...,~n) ~ Ak. This implies that ~~~ II~II ~ oo as k~ oo. Let
(y~, ..., y„) E~2L x... x~2L be a cluster point of the sequence
i
{(ak~,...~akn)} where ak - I~IIy IIJ
- '
`~-i
Since ~ E {x E Xi : ui(x) 1 ui(t~i)} for all k it follows from Lemmas 1 and 2(b)
that yi E CPi for each j. By Lemma 3, ~~lyi - 0 and ~-~ Ilyill - 1. Thus for some
j, yi ~ 0, contradicting the condition of no unbounded arbitrage. ~
Proof of Theorem 5: Since a strictly reconcilable economy is reconcilable, (a) im-
plies (b) follows immediately from Theorem 4. To prove the other direction, suppose
that there exists an integer k siich that for all k~ k, U(A) - U(Ak) and the no
unbounded arbitrage condition (1) does not hold. Then there exists (y~, ..., y„) ~
(0, ..., 0) in ~2L x... x~2~ such that ~ yi - 0 and yi E CPi for each j. Thus,
i
given any (xi,...,x„) E A, (x~ ~ J1y~,...,x., -~ ~y„) E A for all a~ 0 and since
CPi`{0} - li(xi), it holds thnt ui(xi f ayi) is increasing in a provided yi ~ 0.
Now let á-(ó~, ..., b„) be a vector in J2L with strictly positive components. Let
ukE U(Ak) be such that:
~á,uk1 - 6ll1)l(Ó,1L) : 1L E U(Ak)}. (~k)
Since U(Ak) is com`pact for each k there is a uk in U(Ak) satisfying (~). Now
suppose k ~ k and let (xj ,..., x~) E Ak be such that u~ - ui(x~ ) for each j and
k. Since the economy is strictly reconcilable, for any agent j with yi ~ 0, ui(x~ ~-
ayi) 1 ui (x; ) for all a, 0. Therefore, for all ~~ 0, ~ biui (x~ f~yi )~~ óiui(x~ )-
i i
(á,uk) - sup{(b,u) : u E U(Ak)}. But (u~(xj -~ ~y~),...,u„(xn f ay„)) E U(A) for
all ~ 1 0, nnd since U(A)- U(Ak), we have a contradiction. ~
The compactness of U(A) follows from continuity of the utility functions (recon-
cilabilit,y) and rumpnrtness of Xk(wi) fot ench k and j. ~
Proof ofTheorem 1. To prove Theorem 1 we need only observe that from Theorem
4 it followa thnt the game derived from the economy is well defined. In particular,
14condition (1.4) of R.eny and Wooders (1993) is satisfied. Since the game ia derived
from an economy with concave utilitiea, it ie balanced. (See, for example, Scarf (1967)
or Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988, 128-132)). With a normalization of utilities ao
that the utility of each agent from his endowment is greater than zero, it then follows
by standard methods that the derived game satisfies all of the conditiona of Reny and
Wooders (1993) and the partnered core is nonempty. ~
Proof of Theorem 2. (a) implies (b) followa from Theorem 1. To show that
(b) impliea (a) consider the following. Let (Xi,wi,ui(-))~-~ be a strictly reconcilable
economy and let i-( xi,..., i„) be an allocation in the partnered core of the
economy. Suppose that no unboimded arbitrage is not satisfied. Then there is an
n-tuple of net trades (yl, ..., y„) ~(0, ...0) in Jt~ x.-. x ~2L such that ~ yi - 0
i
and yi E CPi for each j. By extreme desirability (A - 2), ui(x -}- ayi) is increasing
in ~ for ~~ 0 and x E Xi. Let S~ 0 be a subset of agents such that for each
j E S, yi ~ 0. For each agent j E S, ui(xi f akyi) 1 ui(ii) for any a 1 0 and for
each agent j E{1,...,n}`S, ui(ii f akyi) - ui(~i) for any a~ 0. Since ~~lyi - 0
and ~~t xi - ~~-i ~i~ ~i-1(xi f ~yi) - ~i-i ~i for all ~ 1 0. Thus, (xl f .~yi, ...,
'x„ ~ay„) is an individually rational allocation and thia allocation Pareto dominates (
i~,..., ~„), contradicting the supposition that (i~,..., x„) is an allocation in the core.
The equivalence of (b) and (c) followa from the definition of the partnered core of
the economy. ~
In our next proof we will use the following characterization of partnered utility
vectora.
Lemma 4. Let (N,V) Ue the game corresponding to the economy (Xi,~i,ui(~))~-i
where for each agent j, ui(-) is strictly quasi-concave.13 Let u E C(N,V). The
following are equivalent:
(a) S(u) ~ 0 is partnered.
11The utilil,y functiun uf(-) u: sLricUy quavi-cnncnve if for cach pe'v x' and x" in X~ with x' ~ x"
Alll~ Gil'II ( Y WILII U G(1 ~ 1, iL hukls that ui(nx' }(l - rt)x") 1 miu{uf(x'),u~(x")}.
15(b) Given any proper subcoalition S C N, S~ 0, if u E V(S) then u E V(N`S).~~
Proof of Lemma 4. Let u E C(N,V) and let S be a coalition satisfying u E V(S).
It is immediate that (b) implies (a) aince, whenever there is are agents i and j such
that j E S and j ~ S then there is a coalition, specifically, N~S, containing j
but not i and such that u E V(N`S). To ahow that (a) implies (b), suppose the
u satisfiea the conditiona of the Lemma. Then there is an allocation x E A(N) such
that for each j it holds that uj(xj) - uj. Since u E V(S) it holds that there is an
S-allocation (x'j)~ES such that uj(x'j) - uj. Since u is in the core, and preferences
are strictly convex, it follows that ~tES ~i -~jE3 ~~ -~~EB ~~~ otherwise we would
have a contradiction to the assumption that u is in the cote. But then it follows that
~1EN~3y7 -`~EN~9i~i~ ao 7L E V(N`J)..
Proof of Theorem 3. The method of proof is similar to that used by Ben-
nett and Zame (1989, Theorem 3). Let (á~,...,i,,,p) be an equilibrium for the
economy (Xj,wj,uj(.))j-1 and consider the vector u- (u~(x~),...,u„(x„)). We know
that u E C(N, V). By Lemma 3, to show that u E P(N, V) we will show that
if 'u E V(S) then u E V(N`S). So suppose that u E V(S) for some subcoali-
tion S C N. Let x E A be such that uj - uj(xj) and let z E A(.S) be such that
u~ - u~(zj) for j E S. If for some j E S, xj ~ zj we have, by the strict concavity
of uj(.), uj((1 - t)xj ~-tx~) ~ u~(~~) for 0 G t C 1. Since (i~,...,i,,,p) is an equilib-
rium, (p, (1 - t)~j ~- tzj) ~(p, wj) . Thus, (p, zj) 1 (p, wj) . But now we have a con-
tradiction because ~jESxi f ~jeN`s~i - ~jeN~i~ yet ~~~~jESxi } ~jeN`s~i~ ~
~P. ~jEN wi~ . Therefore ij - xj for all j E S. Hence, ~jEN`S ~j - EjeN`3 ~j ~d
uj(ij)? uj(~j) for all j E S. And therefore ~i E V(N`S). ft
6 Conclusions
The results of this pnper serve as an introduction to the partnered core of an economy
and the relationship between no unbounded arbitrnge and the partnered core. In on-
~~A similar ohservation was used in Bennett and Zame ( I~J88) to show that the competitive payoff
is partnered.
16going research, Page and Wooders (1994), we extend the condition of no unbounded
arbitrage and establiah further relationshipe between no unbounded arbitrage, part-
nership, and equilibrium.
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